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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 05-4893
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     
vs.
XANG SACKSITH
a/k/a “T”
Xang Sacksith,
   Appellant.
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 04-00390)
District Judge: Honorable Marvin Katz
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 20, 2007
___________
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH and GARTH, Circuit Judges,
(Opinion Filed: September 21, 2007)
           __________
OPINION
__________
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GARTH, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Xang Sacksith appeals from an order of the district court, dated November
1, 2005, denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on federal drug charges that, because
of Sacksith’s two prior state drug crime convictions, carried a mandatory minimum sentence
of life imprisonment.  We will affirm.  
I.
On July 7, 2004, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Sacksith with
conspiracy to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to
distribute MDMA and methamphetamine and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and possession with intent to distribute MDMA and
methamphetamine and aiding and abetting the same within a protected area, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  
On October 26, 2004, the government filed an “Information Supporting Enhanced
Sentence” pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, providing notice that, if convicted, Sacksith would
be subject to increased punishment as a result of his two prior felony drug convictions in
Pennsylvania.  In fact, as a result of these prior convictions, Sacksith was placed on notice
that he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment if convicted.  See
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (“If any person commits a violation of this subparagraph . . .  after
two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final, such person shall
be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release.”).  
On November 17, 2004, Sacksith’s court appointed attorney, Edson A. Bostic, filed
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a motion to withdraw as counsel.  At a November 30, 2004 hearing on this motion, Bostic
stated that he wished to be relieved because Sacksith appeared to not “fully appreciate or
accept the legal advice of counsel.”  A49.  In particular, Bostic stated that Sacksith wanted
to plead guilty to the charges in the indictment, but nevertheless refused to heed Bostic’s
advice to cooperate with the government – which Bostic counseled was the only way to avoid
the mandatory life sentence.  Bostic described, quite vividly, that such a course of action was
“akin to a death sentence, in the sense that [Sacksith] will die in jail once convicted of this
case unless he takes the only avenue I believe available to him to cooperate . . .”  A50.  
Bostic assured the district court that he had no trouble communicating with Sacksith,
a native Laotian, in English, but that he was simply not able “to get him to see the light” and
cooperate.  A51.  The district court denied Bostic’s motion to withdraw, finding that “[t]here
is nothing that a new attorney could add to what [Bostic] has done with regard to the case.”
A58.  
II.
On December 6, 2004, Sacksith appeared in the district court to enter his guilty plea.
Prior to the plea colloquy, Bostic renewed his motion to withdraw and have new counsel
appointed.  Bostic restated his concern that Sacksith’s continued refusal to follow Bostic’s
advice to cooperate with the government – or to at least explain why he would not cooperate
– was “because the level of trust, I assume is not there.”  A63.  Bostic asked that in light of
the severity of the mandatory life sentence the court should give Sacksith the opportunity to
consult with other counsel.”  A64.  The district court then asked Sacksith if he intended to
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proceed with his guilty plea.  Sacksith replied: “I leave everything in your hands, you judge
it, your honor.  I ask for mercy and pray for one day I will make it.”  A70.  
The district court then proceeded to the plea colloquy.  The court asked Sacksith if he
had “ample opportunity” to discuss his case with his attorney.  The following colloquy
ensued:
THE DEFENDANT: Well, we have talked.  All
he told me, I’ll get life if I don’t cooperate and all
of that.  But to tell people I know what I did was
wrong.  I’ll take full responsibility for it.  
THE COURT: Have you had enough time to talk
with him about that, that’s his advice, that’s the
accurate advice, have you had enough time to talk
about it?
THE DEFENDANT: That’s the only advice, I get
mandatory life, he keeps telling me.  
THE COURT: That is sound legal advice, are you
satisfied with his representation of your best
interests, assuming, as I am going to tell you, that
is sound legal advice?
THE DEFENDANT: I say I know what I did was
wrong.  I leave it in your hands your honor.  
A73 (emphases added).  
After the district court completed its explanation of the elements the government
would need to prove to establish his guilt on the three charges, Sacksith stated: “But your
Honor.  I just want you to know that I never had any possession, touched drugs.  I did make
a phone call and brought friends to meet other people.  That’s all I did.”  A78.  
The district court then explicitly advised Sacksith that by pleading guilty he would
receive a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment:
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THE COURT: Now, let me explain what the
penalty exposure is, if you plead guilty on count
one.  The penalty exposure is 30 years
imprisonment, mandatory minimum of six years
supervised release, a $2,000,000 fine, $100
special assessment.  On counts 2 and 3 which
merge, there’s a mandatory minimum of life
imprisonment, $8,000,000 fine and $100 special
assessment.  Do you understand that’s the
exposure, if you plead guilty to counts one, two
and three?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor.  
A78-79 (emphasis added).  
At the district court’s request, the government then summarized its evidence as
follows.  In June 2004, a cooperating witness arranged to buy 10,000 ecstacy pills from
Sacksith.  Sacksith obtained sample pills from two of his co-defendants, Thanh Nguyen and
Toan Kim, and provided them to the cooperating witness, who subsequently agreed to
purchase 10,000 pills for $65,000.  On June 10, 2004, Nguyen, Kim, and a third co-
defendant, Duong Vu, drove to South Philadelphia with a backpack containing the 10,000
pills.  They picked up Sacksith and drove together a short distance to a donut shop at 330
Oregon Avenue, where Sacksith and Vu exited the vehicle and met the cooperating witness.
Vu carried the backpack containing the pills.  Once inside the donut shop, Vu and the
cooperating witness entered the men’s room where Vu showed the drugs to the cooperating
witness.  The cooperating witness came out and signaled DEA agents who arrested Sacksith
and Vu.  
Laboratory results on the seized drugs showed that the 10,000 pills contained a total
1Sacksith pled guilty to a superseding indictment that had been returned on
December 1, 2004.  The superseding indictment did not materially alter the charges
against Sacksith contained in the original July 7, 2004 indictment.  
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of 79.5 grams of pure methamphetamine and 462.6 grams of pure ecstacy.  The donut shop
where the drug transaction was to occur is located within 1,000 feet of Our Lady of Mount
Carmel Catholic School and the Murphy Recreation Center, a public playground.  Sacksith
was to receive $10,000 of the total $65,000 purchase price for arranging the transaction.  
The district court then asked Sacksith if he agreed with the prosecutor’s summary.
The following interchange followed:
THE COURT: Do you agree with the prosecutor’s
summary of what you did?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  Some of them.  Some
of them did.  All I did was make a phone call,
your Honor.  
THE COURT: Is there anything he said that was
incorrect?
THE DEFENDANT: I never seen nothing.  I
don’t know what’s going on.  
THE COURT: Did you hear the prosecutor’s
summary, did you listen to that?  Would you like
to hear it again?
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you hear the summary that he
said?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did hear what he said.
THE COURT: Do you agree with it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that’s what happened
that day.  That’s how it happened.  
A89-90.  
Sacksith then pled guilty on all three counts.1  
2Bostic was replaced as Sacksith’s counsel as a result of two letters Sacksith had
sent to the district court in January 2005, claiming that Bostic had misled him into
entering his guilty plea by advising him that, as a result of accepting responsibility for his
crimes, he would receive a sentence of no more than 10-12 years’ imprisonment. 
Sacksith did not raise these assertions – which Bostic adamantly denies – either before the
district court or on this appeal.  Current counsel, John J. Griffin, entered his appearance
for Sacksith on March 23, 2005.
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III.
On October 6, 2005, Sacksith, now represented by new appointed counsel,2 John J.
Griffin, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he did not understand the
severity of the consequences of pleading guilty.  On November 1, 2005, the district court
conducted a hearing on Sacksith’s motion.  Bostic testified at the hearing that he had
explained to Sacksith “time and time again [that] the court had no discretion once the
government filed [a notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851, which] made the case a mandatory life
case upon conviction.”  A100 (emphases added); see also A111 (“I told Mr. Sacksith . . . in
all my meetings with him, once the government had filed the notice under 841 and 851 that
he was – he would get a mandatory life sentence.”); A113 (“Q: He heard not only from you,
as his attorney, he also heard from me as the prosecutor and from the agents who arrested
him, that he was facing mandatory life imprisonment . . . ? A: That is correct.”).  
Bostic testified that, despite his clear and explicit advice to Sacksith that the district
court would have no discretion to exercise leniency and would be required to impose a life
sentence, Sacksith told him that “he would be seeking mercy from the court in terms of the
sentence to be imposed.”  A100.  Based upon this statement, Bostic “felt [Sacksith] did not
3On the same day, the court issued a formal opinion denying Sacksith’s motion to
withdraw.  
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understand the consequences of his guilty plea.”  A104.  Bostic reiterated, however, that he
was able to communicate in English with Sacksith, A106, and that there was “no ambiguity”
in his repeated explanations to Sacksith that pleading guilty would result in a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment.  A114.  
The district court then heard arguments on Sacksith’s motion to withdraw his plea.
Sacksith argued that, while he could not “claim total innocence,” the court should find his
statement “I never had any possession, touched drugs” together with what he described as
his “equivoca[tion]” before ultimately confirming the government’s proffer of evidence at
the plea hearing as “a crude . . . assertion to some degree of innocence of Mr. Sacksith.”
A132.  Sacksith then urged that his failure to understand the “tremendous gravamen of the
situation” was a compelling reason to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.  A135.  
The district court then denied the motion, stating:
It seems to me, clear to me that the defendant
understood the consequences of his guilty plea.  It
couldn’t have been made more clear by his other
attorney, and it couldn’t have been made more
clear in the colloquy and I think that the game
playing of not understanding what counsel argued
or something of that kind, and saying that counsel
promised him some lower sentence, which was
completely false, is indicative of the fact that the
defendant is simply trying to play the system, that
the motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea is
denied.  
A148.3  
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The court then imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.  
IV.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse
of discretion.  United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Trott, 779 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1985); Government of Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d
214, 219 (3d Cir. 1980).  
“A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty . . . after the court accepts the plea, but
before it imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting
the withdrawal.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).  This court looks to three factors to evaluate
a motion to withdraw: (1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the
defendant's reason to withdraw the plea; and (3) whether the government would be
prejudiced by the withdrawal.  United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001);
United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 711 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d
1066, 1071 (3d Cir. 1976).  The burden of demonstrating a “fair and just” reason for
withdrawing the plea falls on the defendant, and that burden is substantial.  United States v.
Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676-77
(1997)).  
Under the three-pronged analysis set forth in Brown, Huff, and Crowley, “[a] shift in
defense tactics, a change of mind, or the fear of punishment are not adequate reasons to
impose on the government the expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a defendant who has
already acknowledged his guilt by pleading guilty.”  Jones, 979 F.2d at 318.  
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The first factor – assertion of innocence – requires more than just a bald assertion of
innocence.  “Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by facts in the record that support
a claimed defense.”  Brown, 250 F.3d at 818 (quoting United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159
F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1998)).  Furthermore, a defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea
must, in addition to reasserting his innocence, “give sufficient reasons to explain why
contradictory positions were taken before the district court.”  Jones, 979 F.2d at 318.  
As to the second factor, this court has held that, unless rising to the level of ineffective
assistance of counsel, failure to correctly anticipate the sentence ultimately imposed is not
a sufficient reason to withdraw a plea.  See Harris, 44 F.3d at 1210 (affirming denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea because the defendant simply “had a change of heart after
reading the presentence report and contemplating the possible sentence.”); Huff, 873 F.2d
at 711 (affirming denial of a motion to withdraw despite the defendant’s claim that he “was
not aware when he pleaded guilty that the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide for parole
and . . . was not fully aware of the extent of his exposure to possible sentences under the
Guidelines.”).  
Finally, as to the third factor, we have held that where the defendant has failed to
demonstrate that the first two factors support withdrawal, the government need not show
prejudice.  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 255 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Harris,
44 F.3d 1206, 1210 (3d Cir. 1995).  
V.
The district court properly exercised its discretion to deny Sacksith’s motion to
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withdraw his plea.  Sacksith has not satisfied any of the three factors set forth in Brown  and
therefore has failed to provide a “fair and just” reason to justify withdrawal of his plea.  See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).  
First, Sacksith has not meaningfully asserted his innocence.  At the plea hearing,
Sacksith confirmed the truth of the government’s account that he arranged for the sale of a
large quantity of methamphetamine and ecstacy pills and that he accompanied the sellers in
a car, with the drugs, to the donut shop where the sale was to take place.  Sacksith claims that
his statement at the plea hearing that “I never had any possession, touched drugs” was an
assertion of innocence.  But Sacksith’s denial of having physical possession of the drugs does
not amount to a claim of innocence.  Indeed, Sacksith’s admissions during the plea hearing
– i.e., that he accompanied his co-defendants in a car with the drugs to the arranged location
– make clear that he was in constructive possession of the drugs, and that, in any event, by
arranging the drug deal, he was guilty of aiding and abetting the attempted drug sale.  See,
e.g., United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 1997) (upholding conviction for
aiding and abetting drug sales where the defendant “accompanied his brother” to the drug
sales, “drove or rode in the vehicle transporting the cocaine,” and “was a look-out during the
drug transaction”).  
Nor was Sacksith “equivocal” in admitting to his conduct.  In response to the
government’s proffer of what it was prepared to prove at trial, Sacksith issued no denial but
rather responded “Yes, that’s what happened that day.  That’s how it happened.”  Finally,
4Sacksith contends that his admissions at the plea hearing do not constitute
criminal conspiracy under the reasoning of United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281 (3d
Cir. 2004); United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 1998) and United States v.
Wexler, 838 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988).  These cases all involved defendants who claimed to
be unaware of the particular unlawful objective of the conspiracy even while admitting to
knowledge that it involved some general illegal conduct.  Cartwright, Idowu, and Wexler
stand for the proposition that “even in situations where the defendant knew that he was
engaged in illicit activity, and knew that ‘some form of contraband’ was involved in the
scheme in which he was participating, the government is obliged to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the particular illegal objective
contemplated by the conspiracy.  Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 287 (citing Idowu, 157 F.3d at
266-67).  These cases are inapposite because Sacksith never denied – and indeed does not
now deny – that he knew the specific object of the present conspiracy – i.e., the sale of
10,000 MDMA and methamphetamine pills for $65,000.  
5To the extent Sacksith claims that his lack of understanding of the mandatory
nature of the life sentence was a result of his poor English comprehension, his contention
is without merit.  Bostic testified several times that he never had any difficulty
communicating with Sacksith in English.  See A49, 106.  
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Sacksith has not provided any facts either to the district court or in this appeal to suggest that
he is innocent of the crimes alleged in the indictment.4  Brown, 250 F.3d at 818
Sacksith also has not provided a strong reason to permit the withdrawal of his plea.
Sacksith contends that he did not understand that the sentencing court could not exercise
leniency or “mercy” to impose a sentence less than life imprisonment.5  But, contrary to this
contention, the record amply demonstrates that Sacksith was repeatedly advised – and
understood – that the life sentence penalty for his crimes was mandatory.  
At the November 30, 2004 hearing on Bostic’s motion to withdraw as counsel, at
which Sacksith was present, Bostic repeatedly stated that Sacksith was facing a mandatory
life sentence if convicted.  A47 (“[T]hose two priors . . . require[] this court . . . to impose a
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mandatory life sentence on him.  I have explained this to Mr. Sacksith in detail.”); A48
(“[H]e is looking at mandatory life if convicted.”); A50 (“This is akin to a death sentence in
the sense he will die in jail once convicted.”); A53 (“Absent [cooperation] the court is
powerless to depart.”).  
And Bostic testified at the hearing on Sacksith’s motion to withdraw his plea that he
repeatedly and unambiguously advised Sacksith that pleading guilty would result in a
mandatory life sentence:
I told Mr. Sacksith . . .  in all my meetings with
him, once the government had filed the notice
under 841 and 851, that he was – he would get a
mandatory life sentence.  
. . . .
I told him that many times.  I reiterated during the
guilty plea colloquy that in essence it made no
sense to plead guilty to the offense because he
would be pleading guilty to a mandatory life
sentence.  
A111-12.  
At the plea hearing, Sacksith himself acknowledged that his guilty plea would result
in a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.  In response to the district court’s inquiry
whether Sacksith had sufficient opportunity to consult with counsel, Sacksith replied “All
he told me, I’ll get life if I don’t cooperate and all of that,” and “That’s the only advice, I get
mandatory life, he keeps telling me.”  A73.  The district court confirmed “That is sound legal
advice.”  Id.  The district court then specifically advised Sacksith that the punishment for
counts two and three of the indictment would be mandatory life imprisonment: “On counts
-14-
2 and 3 which merge, there’s a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment. . . ” A79.
Nevertheless, Sacksith pled guilty.  
Sacksith cites one time during the plea colloquy when he asked the court for mercy
and two other times where he states “I leave it in your hands your Honor” as evidence that
he nonetheless subjectively believed the district court had some sentencing discretion.  See
A70, 82, 91.  But, in light of both Bostic’s and the district court’s repeated advice to the
contrary – and Sacksith’s own recognition that “I’ll get life if I don’t cooperate” – Sacksith
had no rational basis for this belief.  Accordingly, Sacksith has failed to provide an adequate,
let alone strong reason to permit him to withdraw his plea.  Huff, 873 F.2d at 711.  
Because Sacksith has failed to meet his burden of asserting innocence, and has not
proffered any strong reasons for permitting withdrawal of his plea, we need not consider
prejudice to the government.  Jones, 336 F.3d at 255.  Sacksith has therefore failed to “show
a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B), and his
motion was properly denied.  
VI.
We will affirm the judgment of the district court.  
